The Economic Well-Being of Black Americans: The Overarching Influence of U.S. Immigration Policies by Briggs, Vernon M
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
Summer 2003 
The Economic Well-Being of Black Americans: The Overarching 
Influence of U.S. Immigration Policies 
Vernon M. Briggs 
Cornell University, vmb2@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the African American Studies Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor 
Relations Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Economic Well-Being of Black Americans: The Overarching Influence of U.S. 
Immigration Policies 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Of the myriad public policies that have impinged on the economic well being of black Americans 
over the years, none has had more overarching and continuous effects than those pertaining to 
immigration. Immigration policies and trends have set the stage that has allowed other outcomes to 
happen. From the beginning, when blacks were introduced into the British colonies that would later 
become the United States, to contemporary times, when the nation finds itself in the throes of the largest 
and longest period of mass immigration in its history, immigration policy has significantly influenced the 
geographical, occupational, and industrial employment patterns of black Americans. 
Given the harrowing experiences of black Americans as the only racial or ethnic group to have ever been 
collectively subjected to both enforced slavery and de jure segregation, no form of public policy should be 
allowed to do harm to their quest to overcome these imposed handicaps. Unfortunately, U.S. immigration 
policy has not held to that standard. The burden of this neglect continues to this day. 
Keywords 
immigration, public policy, illegal immigration, labor law, legislation, labor market, labor supply, African-
Americans, black Americans 
Disciplines 
African American Studies | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations | Public Policy 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Briggs, V. M. (2003). The economic well-being of black Americans: The overarching influence of U.S. 
immigration policies. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/219/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright by Springer Verlag. Final version published as Briggs, V. M. (2003). The economic well-being of 
black Americans: The overarching influence of U.S. immigration policies. The Review of Black Political 
Economy, 31(1/2), pp. 15-42. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/219 
15Briggs
THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF
BLACK AMERICANS: THE OVERARCHING
INFLUENCE OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Of the myriad public policies that have impinged on the economic
well being of black Americans over the years, none has had more
overarching and continuous effects than those pertaining to immigration.
Immigration policies and trends have set the stage that has allowed other
outcomes to happen. From the beginning, when blacks were introduced
into the British colonies that would later become the United States, to
contemporary times, when the nation finds itself in the throes of the
largest and longest period of mass immigration in its history, immigra-
tion policy has significantly influenced the geographical, occupational,
and industrial employment patterns of black Americans.1
Given the harrowing experiences of black Americans as the only ra-
cial or ethnic group to have ever been collectively subjected to both
enforced slavery and de jure segregation, no form of public policy should
be allowed to do harm to their quest to overcome these imposed handi-
caps. Unfortunately, U.S. immigration policy has not held to that stan-
dard. The burden of this neglect continues to this day.
THE NATURE OF IMMIGRATION POLICY:
A BRIEF DIGRESSION
Before proceeding, it is necessary to mention briefly the special nature
of immigration policy. Unlike most types of public policies, immigration
policy falls exclusively within the province of the federal government. It
is at the local and state levels, however, that immigration exerts its eco-
nomic, political, and social influences. The governmental bodies at these
levels have no say at all as to what the prevailing federal policies should
be. They and their residents can only respond to the consequences.
Given the prominent role that immigration has played in the history of
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the nation, it is surprising that the subject is not mentioned anywhere in
the U.S. Constitution. But as its significance was gradually recognized,
the federal government—in the latter part of the nineteenth century—
sought exclusive responsibility to regulate all aspects of immigration.
Through a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such authority was
finally formalized.2 In essence, these decisions state that the power to
regulate immigration—while not specified—is a plenary power of the
national government that is inherent in the metaphysical concept of “na-
tional sovereignty.” Being a nation implies a claim of authority to govern
a prescribed land area in order to protect and to serve those people who
live therein. The U.S. government, therefore, has the duty to set annual
admission levels; to establish admission categories; to specify entry re-
quirements; to order entry priorities; and to enforce the restrictions it
imposes. No citizen of a foreign country has a right to reside, visit, enter,
work, or seek refuge in the United States simply because of a desire to do
so. They may only legally do any of these activities with the expressed
permission of policies enacted by the federal government. Accompany-
ing such exclusive regulatory power is an implied duty to design an
immigration policy that conforms to the best interests of the citizens of
the United States.
It is true, of course, that ever since the federal government has sought to
screen would-be immigrants and to limit immigration, a significant num-
ber of persons have simply ignored the policy restrictions and have ille-
gally entered or overstayed their visas. Thus, immigration policy includes
the necessary commitment to enforce the policies that are put in place.
THE PRE-NATION LEGACY OF IMMIGRATION
The roots of the influence of immigration on the black experience stem
from the nation’s lengthy history as a British colony. Shortly after the found-
ing of the first permanent British settlement at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607,
blacks became part of the settlement movement. The first blacks were
brought to the colony in 1619 aboard a Dutch slave ship. As there was no
tradition of slavery in British colonies at the time, blacks were initially
treated the same as were most white settlers at the time. They and others
who followed became indentured servants. They were expected to work to
pay off the cost of their transport and, in the process, gain their freedom at
some future time. Between 1640 and 1660, however, this system came to
and end.3 Blacks were no longer treated as indentured servants; their servi-
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tude would be life long. Thus, racism cannot explain the actual origins of
slavery in the English colonies, but it soon became the rationale for its
continuance.
For present purposes, the formalization of the use of slave labor and the
subsequent importation of tens of thousands of black slaves during the re-
mainder of British rule meant that blacks would be the paramount excep-
tion to the labor acquisition process during colonial times. Blacks would
enter the colonies as “involuntary immigrants” for over two hundred years.
Although slaves could be found in all thirteen British colonies, the slave
system of work was overwhelmingly concentrated in the South. The last-
ing influence of this process has been that the majority of the nation’s black
population has to this day always resided in the South. Employment pat-
terns of blacks, therefore, have been disproportionably linked to the indus-
tries and occupations associated with the development of the southern
economy—especially to its rural sector.
Initially, slavery grew slowly in the South. But in the 1690s the rise of
the southern plantation system caused the demand for slaves to increase
dramatically. In response, the flow of imported slaves became enormous.
By 1710, this influx of more “involuntary immigrants” had reduced the
supply of white indentured servants to the South to negligible numbers.4
The legacy of this regional labor supply policy was that the white inden-
tured servants from Europe and their lineal successors—the European im-
migrants—became the backbone of the work force of the North and Midwest
but not of the South. By the time the colonies won their independence and
the United States formally became a nation in 1788 (with the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution), slaves made up 20 percent of the U.S. population
and 28 percent of the nation’s labor force with 96 percent of all slaves
being in the southern states.
NATIONHOOD AND THE ISSUE OF SLAVE TRADING
Following the successful war for independence from British rule, the
Treaty of Paris of 1783 ceded all British land claims south of the Great
Lakes to the interim confederation created by the former thirteen colonies.
Thus, the original landmass of what would become the United States ex-
tended from the Atlantic Seaboard (except for Florida, which still belonged
to Spain) to the Mississippi River. Becoming the unified nation that would
occupy this space, however, was not an easy process. Among the many
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political issues and regional suspicions that had to be overcome was the
issue of slavery.
Slavery was an inherited problem from colonial rule. In the North, slaves
were few in number and of little economic importance. Hence, in one state
after another slaves were emancipated by statutes until by 1804 they all
had done so. But in the South, where virtually all of the slaves were to be
found and where the extant agricultural economy was dependant on their
use, the issue was far more complex. While few people sought to defend
slavery in principle, many of the former southern colonies let it be known
that they would not join the proposed union if slavery were prohibited. So
resolution of this issue had to be deferred until after the ratification of the
U.S. Constitution and the United States itself was established.
Likewise, the issue of slave trading also became involved in the found-
ing of the nation. By the time of the Constitutional Convention, all of the
former colonies had banned the importation of slaves from abroad except
for Georgia and South Carolina. They threatened to refuse to join the pro-
posed new nation before it was even established if the practice was banned.
A compromise was reached by the drafters of the Constitution. Hence, the
only provision in the U.S. Constitution that has anything even remotely to
say about immigration pertained to the importation of slaves.5 Namely, slaves
could continue to be brought into the country for twenty years—or until
1808—after which time Congress would have to decide the issue. With
this compromise, the creation of the country became possible.
Subsequently, in December 1806, President Thomas Jefferson recom-
mended to Congress that the importation of slaves be prohibited as of January
1, 1808 (i.e., the earliest possible date). Congress responded in late 1807
by passing such a ban.
This legislation, however, did not actually end slave trading, nor did it
have any immediate impact on the institution of slavery. In fact, the de-
mand for slaves increased markedly in the years after 1808. During the
1820s, cotton became “king” and the modern cotton industry of the South
began to develop.6 The number of slaves in the labor force grew from
893,602 slaves in 1800 to 3,953,760 slaves on the eve of the Civil War in
1860. Most of the growth was the result of the natural reproduction of the
slave population. Some was the result of land expansion during this period as
slaves were included with the enormous amount of territory associated with
the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and with the annexation of Texas in 1845. But
the continual import of slaves was also a factor in the subsequent growth of the
South’s own slave population. Since it was an illegal act, however, no official
data exist as to how many slaves were imported after the practice became
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illegal in 1808. Ship manifests were regularly falsified to show cargoes
other than the slaves that were actually aboard. It has been, however, esti-
mated that at least 270,000 slaves—and probably more—were smuggled
into the South from 1808 to 1861.7
In other words, slave trading flourished despite the ban on the practice.
The governmental agencies given responsibility for enforcing the importa-
tion ban (the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Navy, and then the De-
partment of the Interior) all had multiple duties to perform. Moreover, the
funds appropriated by Congress for patrol of the long sea border of the
southeastern United States were grossly inadequate. Outside of the South,
there was general apathy by the public about the importance of addressing
the illegal slave trade issue. It was seen to be a regional concern. As a
consequence, slave trading did not end until slavery itself was abolished.
This process began when President Abraham Lincoln in 1862 issued the
Emancipation Proclamation, which freed the slaves as of January 1, 1863
in those states that seceded from the Union; it was completed after the war
with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in
1865, which forbade the practice of slavery everywhere in the nation.
The effect of slavery on the composition of the labor force was, of course,
primarily felt in the South. In 1860, the slave population accounted for 21
percent of the nation’s labor force with 97 percent of the slave population
being in the South. Some of the slaves worked in towns and cities of the
South but most were tied to rural plantations. Agriculture remained over-
whelmingly the industrial base of the entire southern economy and the domi-
nant occupational source for most of the black labor force.8
MASS IMMIGRATION BEGINS: THE SOUTH IS BYPASSED
In the thirty years prior to the outbreak of the Civil War (roughly from
the early 1830s and lasting until the late 1850s), the “first wave” of mass
immigration from Europe began. Five million immigrants arrived over this
time span. They were responding to an emerging demand for urban work-
ers. The process of industrial diversification of production had begun ear-
lier in the New England states. It was especially associated with the regional
growth of the new manufacturing sector that began in earnest after 1815.
Cotton textiles became the nation’s first major manufacturing industry.
Originally, the employers of these factories sought to use women and chil-
dren from the local communities as their workers.9 But by the 1830s, they
began to hire immigrants from Ireland and French-speaking Canada. Ger-
many also became a major source of immigrants for the emerging demand
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for urban labor. Indicative of this industrial transformation is the fact that
the percentage of the labor force of the states of the North and West em-
ployed in agriculture plummeted from 68 percent in 1800 to 40 percent in
1850.10
Thus, as industrialization was taking hold in New England and around
the urban fringes of the upper Midwest along the shores of the Great Lakes,
blacks still were trapped in the slave system of the South. As mentioned,
black slave trading continued during the critical period, albeit illegally, so
the “involuntary” immigration of blacks was also part of the “first wave”
of mass immigration until the Civil War finally halted the practice.
Largely confined to the South, virtually all blacks were still linked to its
regional economy. Although there were isolated instances where some iron,
granite, and tobacco manufacturing occurred in the South, which used some
slave labor, agriculture remained the mainstay of the southern industrial
structure. Cotton farming was the dominant source of production and black
employment. But other crops, such as tobacco, rice, and indigo, were also
important and, increasingly, hemp and sugarcane became so too. Further-
more, cotton farming (and the use of slaves) shifted during these years
from the Carolinas to the richer soil of the bottomlands of the Mississippi
and Alabama and, still later, to Arkansas and Texas. In sharp contrast to the
experiences of the rest of the country during these early years of the Re-
public, the percentage of the southern labor force employed in agriculture
actually increased from 82 percent in 1800 to 84 percent in 1850.11
Thus, during these years prior to the Civil War, slavery was the force
that kept blacks regionally confined and occupationally concentrated. Im-
migration contributed to the growing size of the black population in the
South. But elsewhere, immigration served primarily as an alternative to
seeking black workers (who could not respond to market forces anyhow
due to the restrictive hold of slavery) or relying on native-born white work-
ers (for whom the western frontier often served as a mobility lure).
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE U.S. ECONOMY TAKES
HOLD: THE SOUTH IS LEFT OUT
The Civil War was not only a turning point in the nation’s social history
as regards to ending slavery. It was also the economic “break point” be-
tween “agricultural America” and “industrial America.”12 The prewar pace
of diversification of the economies of the North and the West accelerated
during the war and took off in the immediate decades that followed.
Major physical improvements were made in transportation systems
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during and after the war. Large military contracts from the federal gov-
ernment during the war hastened the onset of mass production tech-
niques that enhanced productivity in the years that followed. By the
end of the nineteenth century, corporate domination of the business
sector had taken hold and, through a wave of mergers, the scale of many
production units was dramatically increased. The internal combustion en-
gine was introduced as the twentieth century began, which revolutionized
transportation and hastened the development of the petroleum industry.
Thus, by 1920, manufacturing had replaced agriculture as the nation’s larg-
est employment sector. The preponderance of this vibrant and diverse ac-
tivity occurred in the North and the West. The South, in sharp contrast, lay
in physical ruin after the war and only slowly was it able to reconstruct its
infrastructure and its industrial base. Its economy remained bound to agri-
culture.
In contrast, the North and West needed to enlarge its urban workforce
during these years to meet this acceleration of demand for largely unskilled
workers. Immigration from Europe and, to a far lesser degree, from Asia,
became the chosen course.13 It was the strength of the “pull” factors of the
U.S. economy rather than the “push” factors of conditions in their home-
lands that set this mass movement of people in motion.14 Ten million immi-
grants, mostly from Northern and Western Europe, entered between 1861
and 1890 (the “second wave” of mass immigration) and 16 million more,
mostly from Eastern and Southern Europe, entered between 1890 and 1920
(the “third wave” of mass immigration).
It is instructive to note that during all of these years “the greatest direct
beneficiary of the flow of immigrant labor was never agriculture though
farming was our primary industry.”15 The economy of the South, of course,
was still primarily agriculturally based and it was where most black work-
ers were to be found. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the economic growth in the South was slow. For blacks, little changed in
terms of their economic status. Slavery was replaced by sharecropping,
which was essentially another form of bondage whereby credit was ex-
tended but the borrower’s mobility was restricted until all debts were paid
off. “Black codes” were enacted that regulated black conduct in day-to-day
life. Most blacks in the rural South, therefore, were prevented from being
able to leave the plantations where they had previously worked as slaves.
As a consequence blacks “tended to be frozen to agriculture” throughout
this era.16 The imposition of the infamous “Jim Crow” segregation laws in
the 1890s and their enforcement during the years that followed served to
complete the social marginalization process of blacks in the South.
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Thus, during these critical transition years of the American economy
from its original heritage as a static agricultural society to its new era as a
dynamic and industrially diverse economy, most native-born workers (black
and white) who populated the nation’s vast rural areas were left out. Most
of these native born rural workers were living lives of poverty. They were
also lacking in human capital endowments. But given the types of unskilled
jobs that were being created at the time in the urban sectors outside the
South, they were certainly as minimally qualified as were most of the im-
migrants who became the preferred alternative.
Most of these rural workers nationwide were whites but the most obvi-
ous source of surplus labor at the time was the black population who were
still trapped in the South. The percentage of the black population living in
the South in 1910 (90 percent) was essentially the same as it was on the eve
of the Civil War fifty years earlier in 1860 (92 percent). Indeed, the famed
black educator of the era, Booker T. Washington, made the status of black
labor the central theme of his famous speech at the Atlanta Exposition of
1895. He pleaded with the assembled white industrialists not to look “to
the incoming of those of foreign birth and strange tongue and habits.”17
Instead, he asked them to turn to native-born blacks, “who shall stand with
you with a devotion that no foreigner can approach” and, by “interlacing
our industrial, commercial, civil, and religious life with yours…[we] shall
make the interests of both races one.”18 His wise words—while cheered at
the time—were ignored in practice. It would not be until immigration was
cut off during World War I that blacks could finally migrate and compete
for the new array of jobs being created in the urban North and West.
“OPEN-DOOR” IMMIGRATION ENDS;
BLACK OUT-MIGRATION BEGINS
The outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914 led to a rapid decline in
immigration to the United States. It was no longer feasible for Europeans
to leave as their governments were recruiting armies and fighting among
themselves. Travel in many areas was impossible. Over 80 percent of the
5.7 million immigrants who entered the United States over the decade (i.e.,
from 1911 to 1920) arrived before the war, from 1911-1914; 10 percent
came after the war was over in 1919 and 1920.
The cutoff of immigration from its primary supply source (Europe) and
the simultaneous increase in the demand for domestic workers—to fill mili-
tary orders for the government and to replace workers conscripted into
military service—led to the most significant change in economic circum-
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stances that black Americans had yet experienced. Namely, they had the
opportunity to move to urban areas outside the South. The chance was
seized.
When World War I was over, there were immediate signs that another
wave of European immigration was poised to commence. But attitudes and
circumstances had changed in the United States. Geographically speaking,
the continental frontiers had all been overcome. Moreover, the alleged ben-
efits of mass immigration as a source of cheap and exploitable labor had
given way to a recognition that there were also real costs that needed to be
balanced off. Uncontrolled immigration had been found to generate unem-
ployment, depress real wages, increase urban poverty, foster slum housing,
and contribute to a variety of adverse health and safety conditions.19 Fur-
thermore, there were widespread concerns that the “third wave” of mass
immigration had been so diverse in its ethnic, racial, linguistic, and reli-
gious makeup and so immense in its scale that it was proving difficult, if
not impossible, for the urban population to meld into a unified citizenry.
With widespread popular support, legislation was enacted to end almost
a hundred years of continuous mass immigration. Efforts to screen out some
immigrant groups had begun earlier on a small scale, but now legislation
was passed to restrict the level of immigration. In 1917, the Immigration
Act of 1917 had created the “Asiatic Barred Zone” which, in effect, banned
all immigration from Asia; in 1921 legislation established a temporary
annual ceiling of 358,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere
(where most “third wave” immigration had originated) with discrimi-
natory country quotas (favoring immigrants from Northern and West-
ern European countries) until a more comprehensive piece of legislation
was drafted. These efforts culminated in the enactment of the Immigra-
tion Act of 1924 (also known popularly as the National Origins Act). It
established the annual ceilings on immigration at an even lower annual
level of 154,000 persons from Eastern Hemisphere nations (which was
essentially Europe). In addition, the legislation also set individual quo-
tas for each country that was eligible to supply immigrants. These quo-
tas were discriminatory in that much higher quotas applied to countries of
Western and Northern Europe while much lower quotas applied to coun-
tries of Eastern and Southern Europe. Immigration from Asian countries
had been essentially banned entirely by earlier legislation and restrictive
agreements. Likewise, blacks were excluded from any computation of the
population for the purpose of establishing future quota eligibility because
they were considered by legislators to have been “involuntary immigrants.”20
Hence, there would be virtually no future immigration permitted from most
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African countries (except for token quotas given to some North African
nations and some African colonies of European nations).
Clearly, the objective of the national origins system was to eliminate the
foreign born as an important future element in the American population.
Indeed, as a consequence of its adoption, the percentage of the U.S. popu-
lation that was foreign born fell consistently from 14.7 percent in 1910 to
its all-time historic low of 4.4 percent in 1965 when, as will be discussed,
mass immigration (i.e. “the fourth wave”) was accidentally revived.
Support for the imposition of these legislative restrictions on immigra-
tion in the 1920s came from virtually every quarter—business, labor,
academia, and Protestant church leaders. Black leaders also joined in the
chorus. A. Philip Randolph, who later would help lead the civil rights move-
ment in the late 1950s and 1960s, was editor of the Messenger magazine
(which promoted trade unionism and socialism) in the 1920s. In his edito-
rials at this time, he wrote that the United States was suffering from “immi-
gration indigestion” and he favored reducing immigration “to nothing.” He
not only supported “shutting out the Germans from Germany, the Italians
from Italy…the Hindus from India, the Chinese from China,” but he also
included keeping out “the Negroes from the West Indies.”21
The response of blacks in the South to the opening was immediate. Black
migration out of the South began in earnest in 1915.22 In 1910, over two-
thirds of all black Americans lived in rural areas (almost exclusively in the
South). During the decade from 1911 to 1920, 369,000 blacks left the South;
between 1921 and 1930 the number more than doubled (see Table 1).23 By
1930, 20 percent of the nation’s black population lived outside the South,
with 88 percent of these persons concentrated in large urban centers.24
A NEW TREND IS BORN: DECLINING IMMIGRATION
LEADS TO INCREASING BLACK MIGRATION OUT OF THE
SOUTH
The migration trend that began with World War I became one of the
nation’s most important economic and social movements of the twentieth
century. For black Americans, it was the most significant such trend. As
articulated by Raymond Frost and shown in Table 1, “there is a competi-
tive relationship between immigration and black migration out of the
South…. [W]hen the rate of immigration declines, black migration to the
North and West increases; when the rate of immigration increases, black
migration declines.”25
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The reception by those outside the South to the arrival of blacks to their
cities was anything but hospitable. As historian Arthur Link described the
reception in the North and Midwest of blacks into their already existing
urban slums, “they became the object of the suspicion and hatred of white
unskilled workers, most of them immigrants themselves.”26 Indeed, full
scale racial riots—often pitting recent white immigrants versus recent black
migrants—broke out in a number of northern and Midwestern cities begin-
ning in East St. Louis in 1917 and continuing intermittently for several
decades.27
But with immigration controlled for the first time in American history,
black migration soared. In each of the decades of the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s, black out-migration from the South was greater than that of the
entire thirty-year period from 1910 to 1940, when it all began.
The economic effect of out-migration on blacks was to widen their in-
dustrial and occupational choices. Rural black workers, whose heritage had
largely been farm work, joined with similarly situated rural white workers
in a mass movement to the nation’s urban economy. Over the decade of the
1920s, 6 million persons moved from the farms to the cities. It was the first
decade in the nation’s history that the rural population actually sustained a
net loss. With mass immigration finally restrained, native-born rural work-
ers were free at last to seek the wider economic opportunities afforded by
the rapidly expanding urban labor market. Arthur Link has described this
rural to urban migration as “one of the most important changes in the Ameri-
can social fabric.”28 Given their inadequate educational preparation and
lack of skill training, most of these newly urbanized blacks had to start on
the bottom rung of the job ladder. But at least they could finally enter com-
petition. Fortunately, most of the expanding urban jobs in this era did not
require much in the way of job preparation—if one could get hired.
WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: LOW IMMIGRATION
AND THE CREATION OF A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
The depression decade of the 1930s was a staggering blow to the eco-
nomic well being of American workers of every description. But as shown
in Table 1, the number of blacks leaving the South during these years slowed
from its pace in the 1920s but it did not stop. The economic consequences
of the outbreak of World War II in the early 1940s, on the other hand,
shocked the economy out of its doldrums. Black out-migration from the
South soared. By 1950, one-third of the black population lived north of the
Mason-Dixon line.
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With over 11 million men drafted into military service during the war
years and with dramatic increases in related military production levels as
the result of sharp increases in government spending, it was imperative
that civilian workers be found to meet the demand for labor. Immigration
levels, which had been low since the late 1920s, continued to be so. Hence,
national employment policy was forced to tap domestic reserves that had
been hitherto ignored, underutilized, or marginalized. Rural workers were
one source of surplus labor and the rural South in particular was a rich pool
of potential manpower. Blacks poured out of the South—both into military
service and to the domestic job opportunities in the North and West. Others
who responded were women, older workers, youths, and disabled workers.
Thus, despite the withdrawal of millions of working-age men during the
war into military service, the nation’s civilian labor force still increased by
over 5 million workers between 1941 and 1945.
The tight labor market of the early 1940s provided the chance for black
leaders to attack broadside the issue of racial discrimination in employ-
ment. A. Philip Randolph and other black leaders threatened in 1940 to
organize a “march on Washington” to publicize the issue of employment
discrimination in all regions of the country. President Franklin Roosevelt
responded in 1941 by issuing executive orders banning discrimination by
holders of federal contracts—of whom there were many at the time—and
creating a federal committee to investigate charges of employment dis-
crimination. These actions are considered “milestones” in the path that would
lead to the passage of the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964 a generation
later. Thus, the labor shortages of this period and the lack of an immigrant
alternative for employers were both crucial contributors to the launching
of the economic plank (i.e. the equal employment opportunity goal) of the
broader civil rights agenda that would come to a head in 1964.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT SPILLS OVER TO
IMMIGRATION REFORM
In the early 1960s, the major domestic issue was not immigration reform.
It was civil rights policy. But their destinies became intertwined. The civil
rights movement had evolved into an activist stage that used demonstra-
tions, marches, and boycotts to protest in non-violent manners the perpetu-
ation of overt segregation against black citizens in the South. The primary
focus was on the abuses of social dignity (i.e., segregated public facilities)
and the denial of political rights (i.e., restrictions on the right to vote).
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The culmination of these protests came with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In the wake of the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy in November 1963, the political logjam that had blocked
Kennedy’s attempts to address a multitude of domestic policy concerns
was finally broken. The new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, was one of the
most politically astute men to ever hold the position. After assuming of-
fice, he announced his intention to enact a broad social program under the
rubric of building “The Great Society.” Virtually all of this ambitious do-
mestic reform agenda were subsequently enacted. Moreover, persons dedi-
cated to the accomplishment of these objectives were appointed to head the
various government agencies to implement this social agenda.
One of the reforms pertained to the subject of immigration and it was
directly linked to another: civil rights. For to invoke in legislation the ex-
plicit principle that overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the ways
citizens treated each other implicitly meant that there could no longer be
overt discrimination in the nation’s laws that governed the way future citi-
zens would be considered for immigrant admission. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk made this linkage explicit in testimony before Congress in support of
immigration reform in August, 1964: “The action we urge…is not to make
a drastic departure from the long-established immigration policy, but rather
to reconcile our immigration policy as it had developed in recent years
with the with the letter of the general law.”29 It was the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, therefore, that created the political climate needed to
legislatively end the discriminatory national origins system the following
year with the adoption of the Immigration Act of 1965.30
There was, however, an ironic twist to the linkage of civil rights legisla-
tion to immigration reform. While both issues came to the forefront of the
national agenda because of political and social concerns, both also had
significant economic consequences with regard to their labor market
impacts. The economic aspects, however, were not the focus at the time
nor was the possibility foreseen seen that these two policy pursuits could
conflict with each other.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained Title VII, which prohibited dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race, color, gender, religious
belief, or national origin. When it actually went into effect on July 1, 1965,
its terms applied to employers, labor unions, and private employment ser-
vices. As opposed to the other sections of the Act that focused on social and
political practices largely occurring in the South, equal employment op-
portunity was an economic issue and it had nationwide implications.
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Within months after its enactment, however, a rash of civil disturbances
broke out in urban areas across the nation. Over the ensuing years, there
were many more. To identify the causes of these riots, the National Advi-
sory Commission on Civil Disorders was established. It issued its historic
report in March 1968. It found that the issue of employment discrimination
was a far more complex issue than the drafters of the Civil Rights Act had
earlier envisioned.31 Public policies were needed to overcome the past de-
nial of job opportunities and to provide employment preparation. They would
entail far more programmatic action and public funds than the mere issu-
ance of a ban on future discriminatory behavior as stated by Title VII.
If past patterns of employment for black Americans were not to be rep-
licated in the future, affirmative action policies would be needed to reach
out to already qualified blacks for jobs. But in far too many cases, blacks
were unqualified for the high-skilled, high-income jobs that were expand-
ing in number. Too many blacks were disproportionately concentrated in
the low-skilled, low-income occupations and industries where jobs were
declining due to the advent of new computer technology. To change these
employment patterns, it would be necessary to address the extensive hu-
man capital deficiencies of blacks that were the accumulated legacy of
centuries of stifled aspirations, unequal educations, and inadequate train-
ing opportunities. The civil disorders, after all, had occurred at a time when
full employment prevailed (i.e., the national unemployment rate was in the
mid-3 percent range). But, because the black population had become highly
urbanized, and disproportionately concentrated in central cities, unemploy-
ment in these areas remained much higher than the overall national unem-
ployment rate. Moreover, the black labor force was beset with inordinately
high incidences of working poor, discouraged workers, under-employed
workers, involuntary part-time workers, and female-headed households.
There was no thought at the time that many of these same urban labor
markets where blacks were concentrated were about to receive a mass in-
fusion of new immigrants—most of whom would themselves be from mi-
nority groups and many of whom also had significant human capital
deficiencies.
The Advisory Commission boldly stated that the nation had unfinished
business to address if it was serious about fulfilling the ideals of the Civil
Rights Act. It was in the national interest to upgrade the capabilities and
expand the utilization of the available pool of black workers. Otherwise,
many blacks would be condemned to lives in a permanent underclass—
with all of the attended hardships of welfare dependency, crime, alcohol-
ism, prostitution, and irregular work habits that scar the individuals involved
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and burden society. But with respect to blacks, there was also a clear moral
imperative that recognized that their collective fate had been greatly influ-
enced by external institutional forces over which they only had marginal
control.32 A programmatic agenda, aimed at bridging the past period of
denial of opportunities and a future period of equal opportunity, was re-
quired. What was anticipated was that there would be a concerted effort
made over the ensuing decade to give priority to the urgent needs of black
Americans.
Who could have foreseen that immigration reform was about to become
a new example of the institutional policies adversely affecting blacks that
the Advisory Commission had condemned? In earlier times, immigration
policy had kept blacks in the rural South after slavery ended by providing
an alternative source of workers to meet the industrial expansion needs of
the North and West. In the late twentieth century, immigration policy once
more provided an alternative to providing the momentum for the pursuit of
inclusive policies needed to alter the economic status of blacks in U.S.
society. It also sparked pressures for blacks to migrate back to the South
beginning in the late 1970s.
THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1965:
INTENTIONS VERSUS OUTCOMES
The intent of the supporters of immigration changes in the early 1960s
was best expressed by President John Kennedy, who initiated the process.
He stated that, “the most urgent and fundamental reform I am recommend-
ing relates to the national origins system of selecting immigrants.”33 He
recommended that it be replaced by a system that would give “the highest
priority” to “the skills of the immigrant and their relationship to our need”
and it should not “matter where they are born.”34 His proposal did not call
for any significant increase in the level of immigration. In contrast to ear-
lier times, he specifically pointed out that “we no longer need settlers for
virgin lands.”35 Thus, he reiterated that, “the clash of opinion arises not
over the number of immigrants admitted, but over the test for admission.”36
On July 23, 1963, the administration formally forwarded its immigra-
tion reform proposal to Congress. It sought to change the character of ex-
isting immigration policy and was not intended to increase the level of
immigration. Indeed, there were widespread fears in Congress at this time
that increasing the number of immigrants in general would lead to adverse
employment and wage effects in the labor market.
Following the assassination of President Kennedy, as previously indi-
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cated, President Johnson took up the immigration reform banner. It was not
until early 1965, however, that Congress responded to the administration’s
proposals. The original bill had called for a five-year phase-out of the na-
tional origins system and the immediate termination of the last traces of
discrimination against Asian immigration. In place of the use of national
origin as the primary admission criteria, the bill proposed that 50 percent
of admissions would be based on the preferences given to immigrants who
had skills and work experience that were currently in need by the U.S.
economy. The other half would be granted on the basis of various adult
family relationships of would-be immigrants to U.S. citizens or permanent
resident aliens. As before, the preferences would only apply to Eastern
Hemisphere immigrants.
Given the times, political agreement to end the overt racism of the na-
tional origins system was relatively easy. Finding common ground for a
replacement criterion was much more difficult. From the onset, Congress
let it be known to the Johnson administration that any new legislation in
this area must contain two new components.
First, there must also be a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration.
Congress feared that with the extraordinarily high population-growth rates
in Latin America, the absence of a limit would lead to an uncontrolled
influx of immigrants from this region in the near future. Hence, the inclu-
sion of a ceiling on the Western Hemisphere in the enacted bill “was a
necessary quid pro quo in exchange for abolishment of the national origins
quota system.”37 Thus, an annual ceiling of 120,000 immigrants from the
Western Hemisphere was included in the final version of the legislation.
Secondly, congressional leaders felt that the labor certification require-
ments for non-family related immigrants had to strengthened. Thus, under
the Immigration Act of 1965, immigrants from Eastern Hemisphere na-
tions who were admitted on any basis other than family reunification or
refugee status must receive certification in advance from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor that their presence would not adversely affect employment
opportunities or the prevailing wage and working conditions of citizen
workers.
Under other provisions of the Immigration Act of 1965, an annual ceil-
ing of 170,000 visas was imposed on immigration from all the nations of
the Eastern Hemisphere. This figure was slightly higher than the hemi-
spheric limit in effect since the 1920s.
To determine which individuals were to be admitted within the frame-
work of the numerical ceiling set for the Eastern Hemisphere, a seven-
category preference system was created. The new preference system relied
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largely on family reunification as its priority concern. “Immediate family”
relatives (i.e., persons defined under the Act as being spouses and minor
children although it did add parents of U.S. citizens over the age of twenty-
one to this category) were not counted as part of the hemispheric or the
individual country ceilings. Thus, the term “family reunification” in this
case referred to the admission of adult children of U.S. citizens over the
age of twenty-one; spouses and unmarried children of permanent resident
aliens; and adult brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. Collectively, they
accounted for 74 percent of the annually available visas. Thus, family re-
unification became the “cornerstone” of U.S. immigration policy and it has
remained so ever since.38 During the legislative process, Congress reduced
the occupational preferences share of the annually available visas to no
more than 20 percent. The remaining visas, 6 percent, were reserved for a
new admission category: refugees.
These changes in the priorities of the admission system were made in
response to the lobbying of groups that were strongly opposed to abolition
of the national origins system. Recognizing that they could not block the
reform drive on this fundamental issue, they sought to make the changes in
the admissions criteria more symbolic than real. These groups and their
congressional sympathizers believed that by stressing family reunification
it would be possible to retain essentially the same racial and ethnic priori-
ties that the national origins system had fostered even if this mechanism
itself was abolished. It seemed unlikely, for instance, that many persons
from Asia, Africa, or from southern or eastern Europe would be admitted
under the new system because the prohibitions imposed during the national
origins era had prevented the entry of many of their relatives for the past
forty years. Conversely, those favored over the past forty years would most
likely have the most living family relatives who could use their citizenship
status to admit others like them.
Thus, the principle of family reunification, which political supporters
have strongly defended in subsequent years, does not rest on a strong moral
foundation. It should not be overlooked that, aside from making nepotism
the dominant admission criterion of the legal immigration system, family
reunification was based on the nefarious belief that it would perpetuate
past discrimination into the future but under a more politically acceptable
mantle. As Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.)—the co-sponsor of the
legislation—stated on the floor of Congress during the final debate on the
bill in which he urged passage, “there will not be, comparatively, many
Asians or Africans entering the country…since the people of Africa and
Asia have very few relatives here, comparatively few could immigrate from
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those countries because they have no family ties to the U.S.”39 Thus, it was
clearly understood by Congress that immigration reform was not intended
to increase the size of the nation’s black population.
Likewise, there were other things that were promised that would not
happen if this bill passed. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), floor
manager of the bill in the Senate, reiterated during the final debate on the
pending legislation: “this bill is not concerned with increasing immigra-
tion to this country, nor will it lower any of the high standards we apply in
the selection of immigrants.”40 Earlier, in a committee session, he stated
that “our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually;”
that “the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset;” and “it [the pending
bill] would not cause American workers to lose their jobs.”41 But, as will be
seen, the new law did, in fact, set into motion the process over the ensuing
years whereby none of his assumptions proved to be valid.
In the 1970s, two important amendments were added to the Immigration
Act of 1965. Following the imposition of the ceiling on Western Hemi-
sphere immigration, a massive backlog of applications for visas quickly
developed from persons living in Latin American nations (especially
Mexico). Accordingly, in 1976 an amendment was adopted that extended
the seven-category preference system and the labor certification require-
ments to would-be applicants from Western Hemisphere nations as well.
The effect of this extension was that, for the first time, it would be difficult
for any person from the Western Hemisphere who did not fit into one of the
seven preference categories to enter legally. Another amendment in 1976
extended the annual ceiling of 20,000 immigrants from any single nation
in the Western Hemisphere that had been applied to nations in the Eastern
Hemisphere in 1965.
In 1978 another amendment was added to the Immigration Act of 1965,
which finally gave the United States the unified immigration system that
reformers had sought for over three decades. The two separate hemispheric
ceilings were merged to give the nation a single worldwide quota that was
set at 290,000 visas a year.
THE REVIVAL OF MASS IMMIGRATION
Despite assurances that the phenomenon of mass immigration would
not be revived from the nation’s distant past, the Immigration Act of 1965
had precisely this result. As can be seen from Table 2, the “fourth wave” of
mass immigration can be dated to its passage. From 1930 until 1965, the
foreign-born population level declined in absolute numbers; as a percent-
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age of the population, the foreign born had been declining since 1910. In
1965 there was no reason to expect that either of these dominant trends
would be reversed. But, as Table 2 shows, they were—and significantly so.
The precise factors that led to that accidental revival of mass immigra-
tion are too complex to describe here.42 In a nutshell, however, they are: an
explosion in illegal immigration; refugee entries have soared far beyond
anticipated levels as has the arrival of tens of thousands of political asylum
applicants each year after an asylum policy was added in 1980; the empha-
sis on family preference admission has led to far greater numbers of “im-
mediate relatives” (whose numbers are not restricted) than anticipated; and
the liberalization of various non-immigrant (i.e., temporary foreign worker)
visa provisions has led to far more such foreign job seekers than was pre-
dicted. As these unexpected results have been revealed, the responses of
subsequent Congresses has been either to ignore these outcomes; or to pass
half-hearted and ineffective restrictive measures (as in the case of attempts
to address illegal immigration); or to take counter-productive steps based
on false premises (i.e., the expansion of legal immigration in 1990 based
on the assumption that illegal immigration has been significantly reduced
by legislation in 1986).
The impact of the “fourth wave,” however, is far more than the mere
increase in numbers. Unlike the previous three “waves” where the prepon-
derance of the immigrants was from Europe, the “fourth wave” is unique in
that most of the immigrants are non-European and non-Africans. In 2000,
51 percent of the foreign born population of the United States were from
Latin America; 25.5 percent from Asia. In sharp contrast, only 15.3 per-
cent were from Europe and 2.5 percent were from Africa.43 Given these
shifts in the countries of origin, it is not surprising that the racial com-
position of the foreign born population in 2000 has been dramatically
altered.44 Blacks were 13.5 percent of the native-born population but
only 7.8 percent of the foreign-born population while non-Hispanic
whites were 75.9 percent of the native population but 24.8 percent of
the foreign population. On the other hand, the major gainers were the
Hispanic population (of any race) who were only 8.1 percent of the
native born population but 45.2 percent of the foreign-born population;
and the Asian population who were only 1.7 percent of the native-born
population but 23.6 percent of the foreign-born population.
No racial group, therefore, has been more adversely affected than has
the black population by the shift in source countries that has occurred since
1965. Black immigration (mainly from Africa and the Caribbean Islands)
represents the smallest component by far of the foreign-born population.
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Indeed, primarily as a consequence of post-1965 immigration, Hispanics
(of any race) became in 2003 the nation’s largest and the most rapidly grow-
ing minority group. But the issue is more than one of numbers; it also
pertains to qualitative labor force characteristics in a post-1965 U.S. labor
market convulsive with change.
MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE “NEW” ECONOMY
While immigration policy in the post-1965 years has affected the size
and composition of the supply of labor, the demand for labor has also sus-
tained a metamorphosis these same years from anything ever experienced
before. In the three earlier “waves” of mass immigration, the economy
needed large numbers of essentially manual workers. It made little differ-
ence whether they had skills, were educated, or spoke English. In most
cases, the immigrants had few human capital attributes. But in the post-
1965 era, the advent of computer technology and the globalization of trade
have caused a diminishment in the demand for low-skilled workers while
the supply of low-skill jobs (especially in manufacturing) has been re-
duced. Conversely, the economy has entered a new developmental phase
in which the expanding employment opportunities have been predomi-
nantly in the information and service producing sectors.44 By 2001, 81
percent of the non-agricultural labor force of the nation was employed
in service sector industries. The manufacturing sector, which was the
largest employment sector from the 1920s until the mid-1950s, had
fallen to fourth place (out of a total of nine non-agricultural industrial
groupings) by 2001 in terms of employment. These industrial shifts
have also affected occupational changes (a shift in white collar jobs)
and geographic shifts (a decentralization of service jobs as opposed to the
tendency to the concentrate jobs when goods producing dominated). Thus,
the labor force since 1965 has been in a state of radical transformation.
Over these same years the supply of labor has grown dramatically due to
the demographic positioning of the “baby boom” generation, the unexpected
mass entry of women into the paid-sectors of the economy and, of course,
the return of mass immigration to the American experience. Against this
backdrop of extensive changes, the new era of equal employment opportu-
nity for blacks was also launched in 1965.
It is unfortunate that the only one of these forces of change that is totally
subject to public policy determination—mass immigration—has been al-
lowed to evolve since 1965 without any accountability for its economic
consequences. Immigration policy over these years has been the product of
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an on-going series of dubious political compromises. As a consequence, it
now consists of a hodgepodge of ineffective, counter–productive, and spe-
cial interest provisions. In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform (CIR), chaired by the late Barbara Jordan for most of its life, con-
cluded, “our current immigration system must undergo major reform” and
it requires “a significant redefinition of priorities.”45 Among CIR’s many
recommendations were that the annual level of immigration be reduced by
over one-third; that all of the extended family admission categories be elimi-
nated; that no unskilled adults be admitted as legal immigrants; that refu-
gee admissions be capped in number; and that every effort be made to stop
the entry of illegal immigrants.
For present purposes, the significance of the nation’s prevailing immi-
gration policies has been to produce an influx of disproportionately un-
skilled and poorly educated into many of the nations largest urban labor
markets (and, in selective cases into certain rural labor markets.) In the
year 2000, one-third of the adult foreign-born population had less than a
high school diploma and another one-quarter had only a high school de-
gree.46 Moreover, 95 percent of the foreign-born population lived in metro-
politan areas (as opposed to 79 percent of the native born) with 50 percent
living in central cities in 2000.47 As for the jobs that immigrants hold, they
are disproportionately employed in service occupations (19.2 percent);
operators, fabricators, and laborers (18.7 percent); and farms, forestry, and
fishing (4.5 percent).48
THE “FOURTH WAVE” OF IMMIGRATION: ITS RELEVANCE
TO BLACK AMERICANS
In far too many ways, the indicators describing the foreign-born popula-
tion closely resemble those of black Americans, which suggest the prob-
ability of competition in the labor market. For the black population too is
disproportionately unskilled, concentrated in the central cities of metro-
politan areas, and employed in low-skilled occupations. In 2001, 20.6 per-
cent of adult blacks over the age of twenty-five were without a high school
diploma; in addition, another 34.4 percent of blacks had only a high school
degree.49 As for urban concentration, 87.5 percent of the black population
lived in metropolitan areas with 52 percent of all blacks living in central
cities.50 With respect to occupational patterns, 21.5 percent of blacks were
employed in service occupations; 18.1 percent were operators, fabricators,
and laborers (almost one-third of all black males were employed in this
occupation); and 1.1 percent in farming, forestry, and fishing.
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In terms of geographic concentration in 2000, 26 percent of the foreign-
born population resided in the South (the highest such percentage in U.S.
history—with most of this increase occurring since 1990) while 55 percent
of the black population did so.51 Unlike the earlier waves of mass immigra-
tion, a substantial number of the “fourth wave” is now living and working
in the South. Indeed, Florida and Texas rank third (18.4 percent) and fifth
(12.2 percent) respectively in terms of the proportion of their population
who were foreign born in 2000. But the foreign-born population is also
rapidly increasing in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Ala-
bama, which is without precedent.52
By the same token, the greatest growth in size of the foreign-born popu-
lation has been outside the South, which is once more affecting the internal
migration patterns of the black population. As discussed earlier, the black
population did not migrate out of the South until the end of the “third wave”
of mass immigration (i.e., the outbreak of World War I). Throughout the
rest of the twentieth century (as shown in Table 1), there was a net migra-
tion out of the South up until the 1980s (when the “fourth wave” of mass
immigration was in high gear). But beginning in the late 1970s, the pattern
reversed itself.53 Between 1990 and 1996, for instance, the net migration of
blacks to the South was 368,000.54
There are, of course, many factors that influence internal migration of
the nation’s domestic population. But that does not lessen the fact that in-
ternational immigration into specific labor markets affects the internal
mobility decisions of native-born workers. Indeed, research on contempo-
rary labor mobility has found that native-born workers are less likely to
migrate to urban areas where immigrants are concentrated.55 Furthermore,
foreign-born workers are less likely to move out of states where they are
concentrated than are native born.56 Both features cause an accentuation of
the impact of immigration in those urban labor markets where immigrants
are concentrated. As economist Lawrence Katz has found, “there is now
evidence that where immigrants are going, natives are leaving,” because
the arrival of more unskilled immigrant workers means lower wages and
fewer low-end jobs for those who were originally there.57 In those urban
cities in California that have experienced significant increases in immigra-
tion, for example, there has been a “flight” of low-income, poorly educated
citizen workers out of their former communities to the outer fringes of
their metropolitan areas or to other states.58
It is likely, therefore, that the fact that more blacks are migrating to the
South as the twenty-first century begins than are moving out is due to the
extensive immigration into urban labor markets in the North and into the
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coastal states of the South since 1965. But as immigrants have since the
1990s also been moving into the South, there is now nowhere else for blacks
to go. They too will have to confront the reality of the consequences of the
nation’s unguided and largely unregulated flow of mass immigration. But
at least in the South, the black population is significant in size and well
established in its presence to meet the challenge.
Lastly, there is the issue of employment discrimination by the new im-
migrants against black Americans. With the inordinate emphasis given to
family reunification in the post-1965 legal immigration system, it is not
surprising that most of the new immigrants settle in the same geographic
labor markets as have their relatives whose family ties were the basis for
their admission. Kinship, therefore, rather than labor market needs, is the
primary basis for locational settlement. The effect is that most new immi-
grants settle in central cities of a selected number of metropolitan areas
where earlier immigrants from the same ethnic background have estab-
lished enclaves.59 The result is that ethnic networking is often a major fea-
ture of the hiring process in these labor markets.60
Ethnic network hiring was a distinguishing feature of the urban labor
markets of the earlier three waves of mass immigration. Since the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, hiring practices are supposed to be changed
so that it is illegal to hire (or to exclude) job applicants on the basis of their
national origin. But such practices have again become common in those
urban labor markets where immigrants have congregated. The casualties
often are the native-born citizens who also reside in these cities (especially
black Americans) who are denied the opportunity to compete for such jobs
on an equal access basis. As one study in New York City found, “there are
tens of thousands of jobs in New York City for which the native born are
not candidates.”61 The reason, according to the study, is that “ethnic hiring
networks and the proliferation of immigrant-owned small businesses in the
city have cut off open-market competition for jobs.”62 New York City, it
should be noted, has the largest black population (2.3 million persons in
2000) of any city in the country.
Likewise an investigative report by the Wall Street Journal in 1995 found
that in Los Angeles “many immigrant bosses are refusing to hire the nation’s
largest minority” (i.e., American-born blacks) for entry-level jobs in their
enterprises.63 These immigrant entrepreneurs feel that immigrants are “more
dependable” because they are “not inclined to complain about low wages
and lousy working conditions;” they are “unaware of labor laws;” and that
blacks “don’t mix well with workers of other backgrounds.”64 It was re-
ported that “it’s like an unwritten law:” immigrant employers “won’t hire
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blacks.”65 With immigrant-owned enterprises accounting for about one-
quarter of all low-wage jobs in these cities, a significant portion of the
entry-level jobs in these cities are essentially off-limits to native-born black
job seekers. The report found that the same pattern of exclusionary hiring
practices characterized the behavior of other immigrant-owned enterprises
in higher paying industries—like electronics.66
The research in rural labor markets where immigrant labor is found has
also noted widespread use of ethnic networking in the hiring process.67 As
in urban areas, the practice limits job opportunities for native-born workers
for these rural jobs.
Given the racial tensions in many communities between citizens (espe-
cially black Americans) and post-1965 immigrants, the need for corrective
equal employment opportunity enforcement is long overdue.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In terms of immigration policy, the United States began the twenty-first
century just as it did the twentieth century: in the throes of another period
of mass immigration. As a consequence, immigration is once again a sig-
nificant influence on the nation’s labor market in general and the well be-
ing of black Americans in particular.
The most obvious impact is the direct effect. No racial grouping receives
fewer immigrants than does the black community. Consequently, in rela-
tive terms, other groups increase in number disproportionately to blacks—
a fact that has significant political implications. Furthermore, the tendency
of the black population and the foreign-born population to both concen-
trate in a select number of metropolitan areas (e.g., New York, Chicago,
Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Houston, Miami, Washington D.C.)
means that for about one-third of the black population there is direct eco-
nomic competition, for jobs, housing, and social services.
But there are also indirect effects that are the cumulative consequences
of four decades of mass immigration. Most of the foreign-born population
who have entered since 1965 are also minority group members themselves.
Since so many recent immigrants are unskilled, policymakers no longer
seem to feel any urgency about the special problems faced by unskilled
black workers. The consequences have been unfortunate. Black politicians
and community leaders, who in the past were in the vanguard of advocating
for restrictive and enforceable immigration policies, are not critics of the
status quo of the contemporary era. They have felt the need to form alli-
ances with these other groups who favor large-scale and loosely enforced
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immigration policies. Immigration expert David North has explained the
seeming paradox. Focusing on the U.S. Congress—since immigration policy
is exclusively a federal responsibility—North has observed
Black members of Congress, who might be expected to defend
the interests of their often low-income constituents against competi-
tion with newly-arrived illegal immigrant worker, do not do so. The
members of the Black Caucus, identifying with the members of the
Hispanics Caucus, routinely support the Hispanics position on im-
migration issues. The politics of the chamber, in short, are more
important to these Black Congressmen than the politics of the con-
stituency.68
Thus, the politics associated with the “rainbow coalition” have led most
black politicians to remain silent on the chronic need for comprehensive
immigration reform in hope of gaining support for pet programs and of
receiving influential appointments. But immigration policy has long-term
implications that have been shown to be adverse to the economic interests
of black Americans. Unless policy changes are forthcoming—such as those
suggested by the Jordan Commission—the pace of progress for black citi-
zens and workers will be hampered. For as the Emperor Napoleon wisely
said, “policy is destiny.”
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